The following is a summary of the stated research mentioned above. The content summarized here, including the figures and tables, all belong to the researchers (unless otherwise indicated). The summary attempts to stay as close to the original paper as much as possible with some adjustments in regards to jargon, length, or to focus on bean to bar aspects.

Introduction

This research looks at how and why quality certifications have been created, specifically in regards to fair-trade, organic, and protected denomination of origin (terroir) marketing strategies. It does not go into cacao specifically, as it looks at the general bigger picture of these new agrofood markets specifically coffee. However, the same mechanisms can be applied and have been adopted by the cocoa and chocolate industry. It’s an objective look at the benefits and drawbacks of these marketing strategies, and the real-life examples of how they play out.

Although social & ethical focused marketing appears to be well developed and carries a great deal of consumer trust today, there is much more for the consumer to understand. Relying on well established and trusted symbols/certifications as the basis for your purchasing decisions will not always benefit those who you believe they benefit. They also block entry into the niche market those who may be the most “fair trade” for instance, and in some ways have become a hinderance to the the very people these systems were initially out to help. However, don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater. This research paper does a good job of understand it at a deeper level so that you can make more informative decisions and perhaps come up with ideas of how to improve the efforts.

2. Quality takes center in the agrofood scene

In the agrofood market, there is an oversaturation of companies and products. Many firms attempt to evade price-based competition between identical products (such as lowering their prices). They implement strategies to add value to products to achieve an above-market price that economists refer to as a “differential rent’.

There are many ways of segmenting the market and differentiating products such as service quality, nutritional quality, sanitation, as well as social justice, and environmental conservation. May companies develop products with ties to these different markers in an attempt to add value to a product that in many ways may be similar or even the same to their competitors.

Image by @katya Coffee berries. The stone fruit produced by the coffee plant. Each berry contains the seed, which we refer to as coffee beans.

Within the global markets, the large firms and corporations have a competitive advantage: economies of scale, capacity to innovate, and the millions in advertising budgets. These strategies are mostly inaccessible to small or medium sized agrofood companies and agricultural co-ops. Therefore, these small or medium sized firms must look at alternative strategies or market niches.

Quality here does not just refer to intrinsic food characteristics (nutritional content, hygiene, organoleptic “taste”) but also cultural and ethical qualities. Quality can be enhanced through incorporating social values with the food/products. Therefore, quality can be defined as a product’s capacity to satisfy consumer needs, which places greater emphasis on the demand rather than the product itself.

Initially, this social-quality strategy was implemented by small and cooperative producers in a way to resist the efforts of large agroindustry players who they could not compete against directly. Through creating market niches (organic, protected geographic indicators [ex/ real Champagne, or real Parmigiano Reggiano], fair trade) these small produces earn more rent (additional profit), in regards to “differential rent”. This strategy has been quite successful in inserting these values into global markets. Implementing these strategies has allowed small producers to challenge the dynamics of market access, which used to exclude them due to it favoring larger firms. This strategy has become mainstream based mostly on two interconnected reasons:

One, consumers have been made aware of producing foods under the older strategy and the scandals in recent years being discussed in the media.
Two, public policies and NGOs in response to food scares have created a new demand for social-value products (such as organic agriculture).

Food crises have driven the establishment of new norms and standards, and mechanisms to certify these standards in order to reestablish consumer confidence in respect to the agrofood chain. Quality is not a condition inherent in a product. It must be constructed and then promoted to become a collective comparative advantage. A specific quality needs to be recognized by the market (consumers), and then be promoted by the organizations behind. Therefore, this construction of a market niche that revolves around specific quality definitions is a collective process that seeks consumer recognition through quality labels and certification practices. The valorization of quality within a market is produced via certification processes (such as fair trade or organic symbols and labelling).

3. Certification: a space of negotiation and power

The value consumers have of a product depends on confidence consumers give it based on the information they have (through labelling, media, their own research, etc.). Since the quality is based on factors they cannot see or taste (how the environment was treated, how fairly the growers were compensated) then they require something else to base it on.

Image by @socialtyvr How do you shop for food? Do you base it on labels and symbols, or do you do your research and base it on your own conclusions?

Quality becomes associated with symbols of various quality seals or labels, and begin to be recognized by the consumers. If the consumers have confidence in these seals or labels, they will value them more. These labels allow the consumer to quickly make a decisions on products on the grocery shelves, instead of taking the time to research or look into the products and the brands they are purchasing. These signs and seals establish a reputation the consumer gains trust in, similar to trust in brands names.

These signs need to be clear, intelligible, and believable. They require norms and standards to sustain its legitimacy. The diverse requirements of these labels require a public or private regulatory organization which will guarantee the coordination between all actors in the network. They act as a referee in case of conflicts over using a particular quality sign, and apply sanctions on the actors (mostly producers) if need be. The organization/regulatory board establishes barriers to entry to this niche market, and so it fulfills economic functions. It also fulfils legal functions by protecting the rent by impeding the undue use of the quality sign. It fulfills institutional functions by being the quality guarantor. The regulating organization manages access to the market and the distribution of differentiation rents, and provides power for those who undertake those functions.

So the question is, who defines quality, and how is it defined. As well, how norms and criteria are set, and who assesses whether products conform to these norms. These functions fall under the certification system, which may be private, semi-public, public, voluntary, or obligatory. In many cases, these certification systems were initially established by and for producers and or activists in order to gain access to the market, to guarantee product quality to consumers and protect the seals from fraud. This is what happened in the case of organic agriculture, where OCIA and Naturland emerged from the organization of organic farmers in Northern countries. This is also the case with fair trade, created by activists, nongovernmental organizations, and coffee-farmer cooperatives with the aim to provide coops better prices. This is even true for Denominations of Origin (such as Champagne and Parmesan), which had regulating councils which grew out of cooperation between public agencies and local promoters of traditional qualities of products related to a specific region (terroir or local products). These organizations were “self-regulated” because they established their own norms and criteria, and they were “self-certified” because they had control over the process of inspections. Inspection were performed by peers, accompanied by technical advisors and volunteers or activists. The founders integrated ideological principals together with common interests such as protection of local production systems or specific groups of producers.

Image by @timothyjames Denominations of Origin is a marketing strategy to conserve and add value to specific products from a specific region such as is used with wines, champagne, and fine cheeses. Sometimes the denominations are based on intrinsic taste qualities, and sometimes they are in place to protect and market local products to an international market.

The success of the quality-centered market niches has lead to an institutionalization that includes professional inspections and certifications, and establishment of specialized bureaucratic institutions. This is particularly true for EU regulations in regards to organic and Denominations of Origin. Interestingly, certifying organizations have become themselves subject to certification, where their accreditation depends on compliance with regulatory frameworks and international agencies to ensure the inspectors are trained and skilled. All of this subjects the producers of this certified-product a list of rules and verifications procedures which represents a considerable administrative and financial burden.

As food producers seek recognition from public agencies, new rules, norms, and conditions are introduced to comply with official demands. This in turn leads to additional modifications of the system in place. Therefore, public agencies take on a role in supervising and controlling the legitimacy of quality criteria. An example would be the 1993 French establishment of an obligatory government-supervised organic certification scheme, which contributed to causing the collapse of networks that revolved around private qualifying originations in order to give way to a seal owned by the ministry of agriculture.

Within the private sphere, large retail chains adopted quality- and certification-based strategies as well, that were previously developed by alternative agrofood networks. This is a concern for small producers, as this concentrates the growth in the hands of big distributors (supermarkets and hypermarkets) that they become the a chain’s dominant pole. Their size and concentration gives them so much negotiating power that they can impose their purchase conditions on producers and manufacturers. Therefore, the proliferation of quality seals and certifying organizations has coincided with big retailers appropriation of the quality-label strategy, and self-presentation to consumers and protectors of food quality. The standardization of quality has many advantages for large distributors. It assures better management of their supply through imposing norms on suppliers. It also gives them an aura of responsibility in the eyes of their clients, even though the costs of certification generally fall on their suppliers. Even though the retailers have defined the quality standards, they prefer a third party organizations take the role as certifier so that it absolves them of responsibility in case of any problems.

For producers and their intermediaries, placing products on the shelves of super- and hypermarket chains become very attractive due to sales volume. However, this comes with risks for the producers. Instead of the producers dictating quality, it forces these powerful chains to demand their own standards of quality, and the producers in turn lose control over their own definition of quality. This unequal relationship where the power is in the hands of the large chains can weaken producer’s organizations and affect the coordination of all the actors involved in the niche quality market previously established. This unequal balance in power favors the dynamic of increased sales volume and lower product prices - which in turns eliminates the benefits of the original strategy that was indented to help the producers.

4. Fair-trade labelling: from Max Havelaar to FLO

Alternative trade originally represented an integrated commodity chain which paralleled conventional market channels. Products from Southern countries, such as coffee, was sold in Northern cities in special stores managed by non-governmental organizations and staffed by volunteers. Products were sold at prices above those of commercial brands, while consumers who supported these products were convinced of the market’s inequities. In order to increase sales volumes, and at a request by a Mexican coffee growers association, the members of a Dutch association introduced coffee from Southern cooperatives into their country’s markets. And thus emerged the fair-trade model or quality label.

Image by @timberfoster It’s important to remember that today, fair trade and organic is *not* synonymous with intrinsic quality. There is fair trade and organic coffee, chocolate, tea which is of high quality and fine flavour, and there is fair trade and organic products that are of mediocre or poor quality.

This label appeared on packages, and it guaranteed consumers that the coffee they purchased was associated with justice, exchange equity, solidarity, and opposition to the dominant relations within the conventional market. This quality is not a physical quality, but a social construction geared towards consumers who will pay more if the product was purchased at a higher cost, and that the extra money actually reached the producers. The fair-trade label becomes symbolic of the relationship between Northern consumers and Southern producers.

Fair trade grew, and exists in 14 countries in Europe, the USA, Canada, and Japan, under the names Max Havelaar, TransFair, and Fairtrade as of when this paper was published. It was then extended to other products as well, and there are now around 100 different products with the fair-trade quality label (coffee, chocolate, and even jams). In 2002, 58,800 metric tons of products were sold with the fair-trade label, and valued at about 300 million USD.

If the fair-trade actors wanted to enter the conventional market, they would need to deal with other actors such as industrialists, traders, and distributors. The industrialists and traders benefited from the positive images associated with the fair-trade label. Producers were interested in selling more at a better price for them, while consumers were interested in standing in solidarity with the producers on the basis of ethics. The products are carried through this network based on a set of negotiation arrangements between all those involved from producer to consumer. Think of it as a convergence of diverse interests among all the actors of the Fair-Labelling network. This network isn’t built on a general agreement of promoting ideological or ethical principals. It’s based on contractual relationship between these actors and the regulatory institution. This organization of actors didn’t emerge out of collection action out of all the members. Instead, the origin of the rules and idea itself of fair trade emerged from an attempt to respond to producers’ needs. One of the founders of fair labelling acknowledged that the system has not been very democratic (VanderHoff, 2002, p. 12).

From the onset, fair labelling focused on small producers. Later it would include plantation works such as with bananas and tea. In regards to coffee, the label guarantees the product was purchased directly from the small producers at a “fair” price, and directly benefits the small producers. The “fair” price ensures the cooperative receives a minimum price plus a premium to be dedicated to social and community projects. Not only that, but many buyers are obligated to pre-finance harvests and to establish a long-term relationship with these farmers. In regards to plantations, fair labeling requires that the workers have decent salaries, the right to participate in unions, and it prohibits child labor. It also includes environmental criteria such as avoiding pesticide and herbicide that negatively impacts the health of the workers. Fair labelling also supports organic production, which carries a greater price premium. This has head to producer organizations to propose certification processes to be more unified and simplified.

Applying certification norms, controls, premiums, and penalties has the power to modify the organization of the commodity chain and its production processes. Coffee growers organizations report that one of the benefits of belonging to fair-labelling registry has been it strengthens the quality of the cultivation and processing of their coffee beans.

The quality of fair trade is given value in the market through a process of certification. This requires an institution to:

Produce legitimate norms and criteria to decide when coffee can be defined as “fair”
Coordinate the actors involved in the network
Certify the fulfillment of norms by both producers and importers/industrialists
Promote the label and promote consumer demand

This role was initially the responsibility of the foundations, but later was taken on by national initiatives emerging in the countries where the model originated (Max Havelaar, TransFair, Fairtrade). The members of these foundations included members of NGO and alternative trade sectors, consumer organizations, coffee roasters, and representatives of coffee grower cooperatives. The executive role was assumed by a Secretary. International coordination first occurred among diverse initiatives such as Max Havelaar and Transfair in 1993 when an International Registry Commission was created. This Commission defined buying conditions and criteria for fair coffee and administered the registry of producer organizations. The growth of fair labelling in both sales volume and number of imported products occurred simultaneously with the development of national initiative offices and a certain professional specialization among the persons in charge.

Greater complexity of the fair trade sector and the creation of FLO

In order to deal with all this sophistication of the market, fair trade entered a higher stage of institutionalization in 1997. The various national initiatives formed FLO, the Fair Labelling Organization headquartered in Germany. FLO is in charge with making criteria uniform and improving the organization of inspection and certification processes. It also administers the registry of cooperatives belonging to fair labelling. Therefor, FLO has the mechanisms of producers’ access to and exclusion from the fair-trade market. It also manages the use of the label, which it owns, by industrialists. The main functions of FLO are:

Guarantee observance of the criteria of fair labelling by all actors
Administer supply in relation to demand and advice producer organizations on development projects
Offer support to producer organizations in order to strengthen their organization and production

How much trust do you put in these symbols when buying your food?

The national initiatives, mostly based in consumer countries, are members of FLO and in charge of relations with buyers, industrialists and distributors in addition to developing internal markets. Decisions within FLO are taken by a Board of Administration which delegates its functions to an Executive Board headed by a director. A specific committee is charged with developing standards for different products. Regional assemblies of producers play only a consultative role. Over time, the national initiatives lost their personalized contact with members of the national initiatives and producer cooperatives. The latter have complained about the lack of clarity in the structure of FLO, the way in which decisions are made, the loss of communication with FLO members and lack of influence the members with the origination have. In 2003, FLO restructured, and

Four representatives of producer organizations now sit on the Board of Administration. There are also now 7 liaison officials based producer countries to support the cooperatives. Nevertheless, the difficulties persist. Producer organizations have the impression the fair trade’s regulatory organization is guided more by commercial considerations than by solidarity, and acts more against them than in support of them.

FLO was faced with multiplication of brands and competition from other fair trade labels. In order to reduce consumer confusion (or maintain its own interests), it developed a uniform international label for all the initiatives coined the Fairtrade Certification Mark (CM). They stated they wanted to protect the fair trade label from possible fraud and obtain official recognition. Until now, the label was self-certified. The attempt to obtain official approval is contradictory if we take into account that surveys done in some European countries show that consumers have more confidence in NGO certified quality than those guaranteed by state agencies or private firms. This shows the confidence consumers have in the national initiatives. As a result, it was necessary to establish a certification unit independent of FLO’s administration to comply with a third party verification requirement.

Verification processes have become more strict, as opposed to fair trades' previous nature which was characterized by personal relations and shared values. A secondary effect has been the need to charge producers for the certification process. Some producers do not question the principal of paying the costs of third party certification, but they question the lack of transparency with how FLO and FLO-Certification determines the rates charged.

5. Fair trade at the crossroads

Image by @mikeenerio Some argue ‘fair trade” organizations have become big business, and have forgotten their original mission. Which direction would you like to see fair trade organizations move towards?

Through applying sanctions and rewards, labelling institutions like FLO control the ability to market a certified product and therefore these quality indicators act as a barrier to entry. Any market niche tries to preserve a premium price of their products by adjusting production. This is exemplified in geographic indicator labels (apelaciones de origen). However, this same tactic would go against the fair trade core belief that they are to support the greatest number of producers. The original fair trade project had a goal of using the power of consumers to exert pressure on the dominant market placers (giant corporations) to obligate them to improve their prices. The problem with this is that it relied on maintaining a market volume that was high enough to bring on this pressure.

Since fair-labelling policy doesn’t seek to reduce the amount offered by producers, the supply is now higher than the demand. The expansion of the fair trade market is becoming more stagnant. Fair trade organizations can’t adopt control mechanisms since it would go against the character and philosophy of the initiative.

Nevertheless, some producers are still attracted to the fair trade market mostly due to being offered a better price for their product. As well, other benefits include more long-term relationships with importers and roasters, receive pre-financing to pay their producers up front, and acquire more market knowledge. For these reasons, many producer co-ops wish to sell under fair trade conditions and sell the greatest possible quantity of coffee.

The problem still stands that the fair trade market can’t sell all the coffee that producers offer. Many co-ops on the fair-trade register fail to sell about even 20% of their production to fair trade importers. This is sold at market price instead, which is about half of what they would get for it otherwise. Only the more earlier and well established co-ops can sell at least 50% of their crop to the fair trade importers, the rest selling nearly 80% of their fair trade crop at the general market value.

There are a couple of solutions to this, both of which seem to contradict the original mission of the fair trade market. One is to lower the cost for consumers to make it more appealing and increase volume of sales, and the other is to impose stricter barriers to entry for producers. This has led to a debate on the core mission of fair trade.

The board of FLO proposed to decrease the minimum guaranteed price to producers in order to have a decreased price for consumers and hope to increase sales. This was rejected by most cooperatives who criticized FLO leadership who are shifting their focus to the market rather than the producers (as was in the original fair trade philosophy). Even other fair trade groups criticize placing market expansion above the ideals the fair trade initiative was founded on, which will dilute the fair-trade message and offer the possibility of large corporations to appropriate the language and label.

Three case studies look at how greater market volume is being combined with corporate politics and how this modifies the politics of the fair-trade network.

5.1 Carrefour: a third phase of fair trade or its recapture by the market?

Carrefour established a 10-year relationship with Mexican UCIRI cooperative (Union of Istemeno Indigenous Communities) who pioneered the “seal of guarantee” model, agreeing to purchase organic coffee at a higher price than paid by FLO. This is sold in France under the label “Bio-Mexique” without the fair trade seal. With this agreement, Mexican coffee cooperatives can sell a portion of their product that wasn’t sold to the fair trade market here instead.

Carrefour also has its own brand and organic certification, with a “social justice” component, which has allowed it to launch its own social label in France. In Belgium, Carrefour signed an agreement with Oxfam, an alternative trade organization to sell Oxfam products where some are certified fair trade. Therefore, Carrefour benefits from the contact and infrastructure as well as the NGO reputation without having to deal with the logistics of the fair trade network itself. The alternative trade organization also serves as a way to “greenwash” Carrefour’s corporate image. If UCIRI and Oxfam state that Carrefour has not driven down prices, then it shows they don’t need fair trade initiatives to sell social-label coffee. The danger here is that with more power comes more control from Carrefour, imposing its own conditions.

Even if this relationship was seen as a success story, it still shows the disagreements that exist between FLO and its producers. It can also add to the confusion for consumers when they see other social-labels, and perhaps lower the minimum social-justice standards. FLO has criticized Carrefour-type agreements with cooperatives, and that his sort of direct agreement can undermine the vitality of the fair-trade labelling certification model.

5.2 UtzKapeh: the “responsible” coffee?

After the agrofood scandals that shook Europe in the early 2000s, the largest European distributors (such as Ahold, Third World group, Albert Hein), decided to develop a traceability protocol. This “traceability” protocol would provide a product trail and guarantee of origin, and assure consumers the purity of their products in regards to social and environmental terms.

The protocol was named EUREPGAP and started with fresh fruits and vegetables. Max Havelaar, after being disillusioned by the slow growth of the fair-trade market, teamed with Ahold to apply this traceability model to coffee markets.

The idea behind this transition from alternative trade to fair labelling was a way to increase the volume of coffee sold at the fair trade price. The reality was that only 10-20% of what coops produced was sold at this fair price, with the other 80-90% being sold and low market prices. Therefore, a new institution was launched named UtzKapeh. It adapted the same code of conduct EUREPGAP had for fruits and vegetables, and developed by Ahold coffee company and an agreement with Guatemalan producers reviewed every two years by UtzKapeh. The shareholders include: producers, roasters, NGO’s, independent certification bodies, and others. The code of conduct includes: labour norms (salaries and workplace conditions), environmental conditions, and administrative relations. However, this doesn’t include a minimum guaranteed price under the argument that these stand in opposition to free market principles. The prices are negotiated directly between producers and roasters. This has allowed them to link with Douwe Egberts, which holds 70% of the Dutch market and has always opposed Max Havelaar on the principle of minimum guaranteed price. The producer groups justify their participation in that they need greater sales, even though the price may be only slightly higher than the commodity market price.

UtzKapeh guarantees a “certified responsible coffee”. The coffee is marketed by a chain of supermarkets that must be certified under the same code of conduct. This new seal competes directly with fair labelling. It poses a risk to the achievements of fair trade, which does not include a minimum guaranteed price. As well, it provides larger corporations an easier way to “greenwash” their image.

5.3 Starbucks: the “total quality” concept

100% FairTrade only 1% of the time. Sometimes the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Do you think Starbucks is helping the true cause of fair trade, or is it greenwashing itself for its own benefit?

In the USA, TransFair, a FLO member, is betting on growth in the dynamic, fast-growing “speciality coffee” market segment. Its strategy combines two consumer demands: intrinsic qualities and social qualities. The early years of fair trade in the US focused on small and medium roasters who had contacts with cooperatives on one side and consumers on the other.

However, the entry of Starbucks has provided a lift to fair-trade sales, even though they only buy 1% of its coffee from fair trade certified producers. Starbucks does sell fair-trade coffee once a month under its promotional “coffee of the day” in its thousands of establishments around the world. Again, the criticism here is that this very minimal percentage they use allows them to greenwash the entire supply chain and corporate image as socially responsible.

Starbucks states that although all of its coffee is not fair-trade, it offers all of its suppliers a fair price (US $1.20/lb on average). TransFair USA has signed similar agreements with other large corporations such as Procter and Gamble, Green Mountain, and Dunkin’ Donuts - doubling fair-trade coffee sales in 2003.

The small to medium roasters that buy 100% fair-trade coffee are now abandoning the Transfair seal - arguing that large corporate buyers purchase a minimum amount of fair-trade coffee with the intention of increasing market power, not actually help producers. TransFair argues that Starbucks does not promote fair trade in a sufficient measure, and also that their participation has helped market the fair-trade label.

Starbucks launched a new seal called “shade grown” (Coffee produced under a canopy of shade trees) with a great deal of public relations campaigns to tell consumers that buying this coffee improves the livelihoods of Mexican and Central American producers. Starbucks signs agreements with producer organizations that they will purchase the coffee that meets specific quality norms. These quality norms puts intrinsic taste qualities first and adds a bit of ecology and social justice. In comparison to other organic or fair-trade certifications, this is sort of a “code of conduct-lite”. The certifying organization is called Conservation International (CI) whose sources of financing include the US Agency for International development (USAID) and companies Citygroup, Exxon Mobil, ICBG, McDonalds, and Starbucks. CI is to provide help to producers in regards to production, processing, and commercialization. Coffee producers receive a good price for their coffee, but lose control over their internal organizational resources and come under the control of CI. Starbucks also obligates producers to sell their coffee through Starbucks-affiliated importers. These affiliates turn out to be the largest Mexican coffee marketing corporation, AMSA, which engages in non-equitable commercial practices. Due to this, some cooperatives have broken off from Starbucks while denouncing the AMSA practice of misusing the registry of certified-organic producers for AMSA’s benefit. From the producer cooperative perspective, they don’t have confidence in the network of commercial organizations, yet find it difficult to let go of the additional higher-priced coffee sales.

6. Conclusion

Fair trade grew out of a desire to help Southern producers and help them sell directly to Northern markets at prices considered fair. As it grew, it became more complex and eventually more centralized and professionalized. Fair-trade was successful enough that it also had to protect its quality label against fraud. Through this growth and development, the core of fair trade philosophy and principals has been challenged. One major aspect has been removing the power the producers had, and putting it into the hands not certification boards and interestingly enough gigantic corporations, forcing producers once again to be at their mercy. Similar to the organic sphere, a contradiction arose where something that was created to benefit the producers now requires them to assume the costs of the certification.

However, the need to grow the fair trade and social oriented niche markets has put the focus of the fair trade institutions on the market as opposed to the original idea of the producers being the main focus. Allowing larger distributors and commercial roasters into the fair trade market offers opportunities as well as risks. It allows for an increase in sales, but also erodes the labels identity. It also risks reducing the prices long term when the larger actors come into play due to the power being in their hands, not the producers.

The 3 case studies here showed the rise in larger corporations wanting to get on board with the advantages of fair trade without taking on all the risks. We now see a rise in parallel labelling, aside from FLO, some of which are inferior in price and criteria to FLO. This increase in labels also adds confusion to consumers, and may dilute the importance of fair trade labelling. Consumers seem to lack the time or will to understand and compare labels, and may be overwhelmed by too much information.

All have this has lead to not an answer, but more questions.

If fair trade intends for its concepts to be universal, is it the role of a private organization to achieve this?
Is equity in market exchange something to be decided by consumers?
Is it the duty of fair trade to evaluate and certify production, labor, and environmental practices
Does that not imply assuming regulatory functions now exercised by states or labor organizations?

Quality certification, regulation and power in fair trade